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Legal Ethics: Unauthorized Practice of
Law by Collection Agencies
Defendant collection agency solicited accounts from the pub-
lic and attempted to collect. If the usual collection procedures
failed, the collection agency informed the creditor that the
agency was willing to bring a lawsuit on the account as agent
or assignee of the creditor. When the creditor agreed to such
action, the collection agency retained an attorney and started
legal proceedings, either in the creditor's name or in its own
name as assignee. All legal work was done by licensed attorneys
hired and controlled by the collection agency. In an action
for an injunction brought by the State Bar Association of Wis-
consin, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that such activities
constituted the unauthorized practice of law. State ex Tel. State
Bar v. Bonded Collections, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 250 (Wis. 1967).
The practice of law is the performance of legal services for
others.1 Such activities constitute the unauthorized practice of
law if performed by persons who are not permitted by law to
do so.2 A lay person practices law either by acting as an attor-
ney and performing legal services directly,3 or by interposing
himself as an intermediary between a licensed attorney and a
client.4 In deciding whether acts are the unauthorized practice
1. In certain instances the practice of law by laymen is permitted
in some states: services performed for another by one who has a sub-
stantial interest in the matter, Wyche v. Works, 373 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1963) (contract for broker's commission); services performed
for another ancillary to a regular profession, Bar Ass'n v. Union Plant-
ers Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767 (1959) (drafting
legal documents intimately connected with the business); and services
performed by lay specialists if not involving complex legal questions,
Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 355 (1952) (conveyancing by a
real estate broker). However, the various states disagree on what is
permissible. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED PACTICE
SOURCE BOOK 70-76 (1965).
2. Many definitions are available but this one seems as broad and
accurate as possible. For another definition see Johnstone, The Unau-
thorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among Power Groups, 4 U.
KAN. L. REv. 1 (1955).
3. See, e.g., Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373 (3d
Cir. 1966) (president of corporation acting as attorney for corporation);
Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954) (accountant);
People ex tel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693
(1948) (disbarred attorney).
4. See, e.g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill.
346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937) (layman operating workmen's compensation
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of law,5 the courts rely on different factors depending upon
whether the direct practice of law by an individual or the in-
direct practice of law by a lay intermediary is involved.
The exercise of control over the attorney by a person other
than the one whose interests are at stake in the legal proceeding
is the indirect practice of law. The courts impute to the inter-
mediary the acts of his attorney on an agency theory. Thus, if
the attorney is practicing law, the person who hires and con-
trols the attorney is also practicing law. The unauthorized prac-
tice of law by a lay intermediary is deemed undesirable be-
cause of the danger of solicitation which may result in the en-
couragement of lawsuitss and, more importantly, the absence
of an attorney-client relationship." The primary evil in the lack
of an attorney-client relationship is said to be the diverting of
the duty and allegiance of the attorney from the person
whose interests are at stake in the legal proceedings, 10 thereby
giving rise to a possible conflict of interest. Diverted allegiance
bureau); Bay County Bar Ass'n v. Finance Sys., Inc., 345 Mich. 434,
76 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (collection agency); In re Disbarment of George H.
Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318 (1930) (bank); Stack v. P.G.
Garage, Inc., 7 N.J. 118, 80 A.2d 545 (1951) (realtor).
5. This responsibility, inherent in the judicial power, is primarily
the concern of the courts. E.g., Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d
577 (1937).
6. The rationale underlying the regulation of the direct prac-
tice of law by nonlawyers is based primarily on a desire to protect
the public. The layman lacks the legal education and training of an
attorney and is not subject to the same high standards of conduct or closejudicial scrutiny. Moreover, the layman has not met the standards of
competence set by each state which authorize the practice of law in that
state. For these reasons, the courts and legislators of this country have
decided that the nonlawyer, when practicing law, performs a disservice.
to the public. Ai%.nRICAii BAR FOUNDATIOi, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
STATUTE BOOK iii (1961). However, as to a lay intermediary, these ob-jections are not valid because the legal services are actually performed
by a qualified attorney who is subject to the same standards as any
other attorney.
7. See Nelson v. Smith, 107 Utah 382, 394, 154 P.2d 634, 640 (1944);
Otterbourg, Collection Agency Activities: The Problem from the Stand-
point of the Bar, 5 LAw & CONTEAMTP. PRoB. 35, 37 (1938). The courts
tend to discourage indirect methods of doing what cannot be done di-
rectly. Comment, 24 U. CH. L. REv. 572, 576 (1957).
8. See State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S. Dudley & Co., 340 Mo. 852,
102 S.W.2d 895 (1937); Otterbourg, supra note 7.
9. See Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W.2d 579 (1944); Bay
County Bar Ass'n v. Finance Sys., Inc., 345 Mich. 434, 76 N.W.2d 23(1956); Comment, 41 Mnm. L. REV. 476, 478 (1957); Comment, 21
RuacrEis L. REv. 577 (1967).
10. Note, Unauthorized Practice of Law by Collection Agencies, 8
W. Rs. L. R v. 492, 500 (1957); see Comment, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 572, 576
(1957); authorities cited notes 3 & 9 supra.
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must be found before the activities constitute the unauthor-
ized practice of law by a lay intermediary."
Courts have considered the legality of many different
methods used by collection agencies to collect accounts for oth-
ers. It is generally accepted that the usual collection agency
practice of dunning is legal. 1 2 The outright assignment of the
whole account for purposes of collection is also considered legal,
since the creditor retains no interest in the account or in the
outcome of any possible litigation. 3 Since the creditor has no
interest, the collection agency is not representing his interests
and, therefore, is not an intermediary. Forwarding, the trans-
fer of an account to an attorney chosen either by the creditor
or the collection agency,' 4 is permissible 5 if the collection agency
is to perform only ministerial duties.' 6 The collection agency
11. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
12. State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S. Dudley & Co., 340 Mo. 852,
102 S.W.2d 895 (1937); Goodman v. Provident Credit Co., 10 Ohio Op.
77, 25 Ohio L. Abs. 492 (C.P. 1937).
13. If the assignment were taken at the initial contact between the
creditor and the collection agency, this result is correct. It would be
merely an assignment of an account. The collection agency becomes
the sole owner of the account and has a right to collect as it deems
necessary, including hiring an attorney to bring suit. If, however, the
assignment is taken at the time when it is obvious that legal proceed-
ings are necessary, it may be deemed invalid as contrary to public
policy and may constitute the unauthorized practice of law. See Pro-
fessional Recovery Servs., Inc. v. John & Mary Doe, 29 UNFAm PRAc-
TICE NEws 80 (La. 1962).
14. For an excellent analysis of what constitutes forwarding and
the requisities of valid forwarding see Commercial Law League, Re
Forwarding of Collection Claims by Agencies to Lawyers, 65 CoM. L.J.
207, 213 (1960); Maxwell & Zug, Brief Sur Draft Opinion and Proceed-
ings Before the Committee on Behalf of the Commercial Law League of
America, 66 CoM. L.J. 155, 161 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Brief Sur
Draft]. There is presently little doubt that a person may engage an
agent to select an attorney and arrange compensation, which is often
done in forwarding. See, e.g., State ex rel. District Attorney v. Lytton,
172 Tenn. 91, 96, 110 S.W.2d 313, 315 (1937).
15. Brief Sur Draft 161; Commercial Law League, supra note 14,
at 207. See also Comment, 41 MIN. L. REv. 475 (1957).
16. Commercial Law League, supra note 14, at 219, app. 2. The
requisites of proper forwarding are: 1) the attorney must be paid by
the creditor; 2) the forwarding must be expressly authorized by the
creditor and must comply with Canons 34, 35, and 47 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Canon 34 prohibits division of fees for legal serv-
ices except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility. Canon 35 prohibits control or exploitation of a law-
yer's services by a lay agency which intervenes between the client and
the lawyer. Canon 47 prohibits attorneys from aiding or making pos-
sible the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency. See ABA




must not receive a share of the attorney fees17 and must have
no control over the attorney.'8 If the collection agency exer-
cises control beyond ministerial duties, it will be engaged in the
practice of law as an agent of the creditor in conducting the
lawsuit.19 When control and the duty and allegiance of the
attorney are diverted from the creditor,20 it is usually held
that the collection agency is engaged in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law.21 The difference between forwarding and acting as
an agent 2 is merely a matter of degree.
The taking of a partial assignment by a collection agency for
the purpose of commencing legal proceedings is generally con-
sidered to be the unauthorized practice of law.23 The creditor
retains no control over his interest in the account and the collec-
tion agency, therefore, is acting as an intermediary.24 Solicita-
tion is present, and the allegiance of the attorney is diverted
to the collection agency, apparently because it is an independent
17. See CANoN 34.
18. See CANoN 35.
19. See CANoN 35; Commercial Law League, supra note 14, at 214-
15; Comment, 24 U. Cm. L. REV. 572, 576 (1957).
20. The diverted allegiance is apparently found because the col-
lection agency operates as an independent entity. See Comment, 21
RUTGERS L. REv. 577, 584 (1967).
21. See Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law
of the American Bar Association, Informative Opinion A of 1962, 28
UNFAIR PRACTICE NEWS 36, 41 (1962); Note, Unauthorized Practice of
Law by Collection Agencies, 8 W. REs. L. REv. 492, 500 (1957); Com-
ment, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 572 (1957).
22. See Strong v. West, 110 Ga. 382, 35 S.E. 693 (1900) (agency
agreement valid). Contra, Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 16 N.W.2d
579 (1944).
23. See, e.g., Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d 914
(1942); Bay County Bar Ass'n v. Finance Sys., Inc., 345 Mich. 434,
76 N.W.2d 23 (1956); State v. James Sanford Agency, 167 Tenn. 339,
69 S.W.2d 895 (1934); Nelson v. Smith, 107 Utah 382, 154 P.2d 634 (1944).
Contra, Cohn v. Thompson, 128 Cal. App. 783, 16 P.2d 364 (1932);
Mutual Bankers Corp. v. Covington Bros. & Co., 277 Ky. 73, 125 S.W.2d
202 (1939). See also Resh, Collection Agencies-The Case Against As-
signment for the Purpose of Suit, 32 UNFrm PRACTICE NEWS 1 (1966).
Most courts say that the partial assignment is valid and gives the
collection agency standing to sue. The mere fact of validity of the
assignment, however, does not necessarily authorize the collection agency
to sue. The courts say that the statutes giving standing to sue are
merely procedural and are intended to protect the debtors in these cases.
The effect of one having standing to sue is merely a guarantee to the
debtor that if he is sued by such a person, another who also has an
interest may not also collect from the debtor. See Bump v. District
Court, supra; Bay County Bar Ass'n v. Finance Sys., Inc., supra. The
standing to sue statutes, therefore, have no effect on whether a person
is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
24. See note 23 supra.
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entity.25
In the instant case, the collection agency took an assign-
ment of a part interest in the account. The court found that
the assignee had only a "naked legal title" and the creditor,
whose cause of action was at stake in the lawsuits, remained
the true client.26 The court also found that control of the law-
suit was in the hands of the collectioia agency, and, since its inter-
est in the account was merely a fee for services rendered,27 it
was an intermediary. Such arrangement diverted the duty and
allegiance of the attorney from the creditor to the collection
agency.28 The court concluded that habitual activity of this type
for a fee constituted the unauthorized practice of law. 29
The court similarly objected to the diversion of allegiance
and control by the collection agency in connection with the
agency agreements, and consequently held that these also con-
stituted the unauthorized practice of law. The court recognized,
however, that where a true attorney-client relationship is cre-
ated, there is no unauthorized practice of law problem even
though the attorney deals with an agent of the creditor.30
Although Bonded follows the raajority of decisions in this
area,3 1 the rationale of the courts should be reconsidered in light
of the needs of society today. Collection agencies have been
operating in this country for over one hundred years 32 and most
authorities agree they serve a useful and needed business func-
tion. 3 They are not, in and of themselves, contrary to any
25. See note 20 supra.
26. 154 N.W.2d at 255.
27. Finding that the collection agency's interest in the account was
for a fee only was not necessary to finding control and diverted alle-
giance because, when only a partial interest is assigned, the collection
agency still represents the creditor as to his remaining interest.
28. 154 N.W.2d at 256.
29. Id. The requirement of a fee, however, has been generally
abandoned by courts in recent years. The argument is that the ac-
tivity itself is objectionable, not just when it is for profit. Therefore, it
should be the unauthorized practice of law regardless of whether or not
a fee is paid. Cf. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz.
76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961); Winkenhofer v. Chaney, 369 S.W.2d 113 (Ky.
1963); Report of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of
the Law, Pernicious Doctrines, 60 A.B.A. REP. 521, 533 (1935). Although
these cases deal with the direct practice of law, the lay intermediary
problem should be treated similarly with respect to the question of a fee.
30. 154 N.W.2d at 257.
31. See note 23 supra.
32. Brief Sur Draft 156.
33. Id.; Commercial Law League, supra note 14, at 207; Note,




public policy 4 and are generally recognized as valid and legal
business enterprises. They provide a service which cannot, in
many cases, be provided as economically by the creditors them-
selves,35 especially in the case of smaller operations. 6
Although the procedure of forwarding does relieve the credi-
tors from some of the burdens of collection,37 the number of
accounts handled by Bonded as agent or assignee for commenc-
ing and controlling legal proceedings seems to indicate a strong
desire for these services. 38 Apparently, the creditors want to
let someone with expertise handle the collections and, when
necessary, the direction of attorneys. Assignment of the whole
account similarly eliminates the burden and nuisance on the
creditor, but it is not often used, probably because of the diffi-
culty in ascertaining reasonable prices for the uncollectable ac-
counts and the desire of the creditor to take some of the risk
himself on the chance that his accounts are more valuable than
the average.
On examining the danger of increased litigation through active
solicitation, it seems doubtful that the procedures utilized by
Bonded will substantially increase it. Solicitation is present in
both the forwarding process and assignment procedures and it is
likely that most accounts handled by collection agencies will
involve legal proceedings if they are otherwise uncollectable,
and if the creditor wants to sue. Even assuming, however,
that litigation will increase, this is not necessarily evil since
creditors have a right to collect valid debts owed to them, and
providing an easier and more economical method of collecting
what is legally owing is, generally, of positive value.
34. See Public Serv. Traffic Bureau, Inc. v. Haworth Marble Co.,
40 Ohio App. 255, 178 N.E. 703 (1931).
35. Brief Sur Draft 158. Collection agencies solicit accounts from
creditors for collection. Compensation is usually determined as a
percentage of the amount recovered. If the agency cannot collect
through their dunning procedure, they usually either return the account
to the creditor or forward it to an attorney. If it is forwarded to an
attorney, the agreement with the creditor usually provides that the
creditor will receive a percentage of the amount recovered. The per-
centage is generally much lower than that agreed upon if the dunning
had produced collection. Brief Sur Draft 155-57.
36. See Brief Sur Draft 159.
37. If the account is forwarded, the creditor is relieved from the
burdens of finding a lawyer and performing ministerial duties, but he
still must communicate with the attorney and make decisions.
38. It was alleged that Bonded instituted over 1000 legal actions
from May, 1962, to July, 1965, as assignee or agent of creditors. From
July, 1964 to July, 1965, it is alleged that Bonded instituted over 65%
of all the claims filed in the small claims court of Eau Claire. 154
N.W.2d at 252.
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The mere existence of control of an attorney by one other
than the client is not objectionable."' A person should be able
to select whomever he pleases to deal with his attorney so long
as that person does not have interests which substantially con-
flict with those of the principal. If a creditor feels someone
other than himself can better handle the collection of accounts,
including legal proceedings, there should be no objection to his
hiring that person. Large institutions can provide themselves
with such expert services internally, and small creditors should
have the same opportunities to acquire expert assistance. 40
The danger of diverting the attorney's allegiance and creat-
ing a conflict of interest does not necessarily exist. The rela-
tionship between the collection agency and the creditor should
be examined as to their respective interests. If their interests
are the same, it should not matter that the attorney owes his
allegiance to one rather than the other as his work will be
equally beneficial to both.41 Also, even if there is a conflict of
interest, it should not be fatal if there is full disclosure and
the parties agree on representation.42
Furthermore, the interests of the collection agency and the
creditor will not substantially conflict if they arrange to split
the amount recovered. The agency will be anxious to collect
without an attorney in order to minimize expenses which are
split by both. It will not unreasonably compromise the claim
because the fee it receives is dependent on the amount of re-
covery.43  It will not bring unjust lawsuits because, if there is
39. See note 30 supra.
40. Brief Sur Draft 159.
41. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 88 Sup.
Ct. 353 (1967), in which the Court recognized that in certain lay inter-
mediary situations there is no substantial conflict of interest, great need
for the services, and no lowering of the legal ethics standards. The
Court, therefore, balanced such interests against those of freedom of
association under the first amendment and held in favor of the inter-
mediary.
42. See CAoN 6. The conflict of interests regulation is directed at
attorneys, therefore, it may be used to prohibit attorneys taking cases
where there are substantial conflicts of interests. See In re Blatt, 42
N.J. 522, 201 A.2d 715 (1964). If the attorney takes such a case, he is
at fault, not the collection agency. If attorneys do not take cases if
there is a substantial conflict of interests between the collection agency
and the creditor, the collection agencies will not be able to prosecute
the lawsuits with attorneys. If they seek to prosecute without an at-
torney, they will be practicing law directly and therefore be engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law.
43. About 60-75% of accounts sent to collection agencies are col-
lected without attorneys-of those remaining which are sent to at-
torneys (not all are) about 50-75% are collected without a law suit.
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